We substitute this into (2) for i = k +1 to obtain ( ) 
(iv) From the proof of part (ii), we know that Y > θ i x i . Therefore,
On the other hand, from the proof of part (i), we know that ; we can then show that
In other words, when g increases, the first order response by a vendor to this change is to increase quality and decrease market share. However, when θ i = 1, the vendor cannot increase quality any further and its only first order response would be to decrease its market share. Since such a response complements other vendors' actions, in equilibrium, x i must decrease.
(v) We prove this part by contradiction. Let there be an equilibrium with θ i = θ k < 1, for some k < i, with 1 < i, k < n. We know that vendor i solves the following maximization problem:
Since θ i < 1 (by assumption), the first order condition with respect to θ i must be satisfied:
Furthermore, since θ i = θ j , for all j, k < j < i, we know from above that the market shares of these vendors would be equal. We set
We now consider how the revenue of the k th vendor changes with the quality of its own product:
Substituting (A3) into the above expression, we get , which is a violation of the first order condition for an interior
Proof of Theorem 1
We first show that there exists a g beyond which all vendors offer a quality level of one. To see this, consider vendor 1. Its profit is given by
θ j x j and G = 1 + gY. Furthermore, from the proof of Proposition 1(i), we know that in equilibrium. which is clearly an increasing function of g. Since cN(1) is bounded, for a sufficiently large g, we will have
is an increasing convex function, the above means that, in equilibrium, an interior solution is not possible and θ 1 = 1. This, in turn, implies that θ i = 1, for all i = 2, …, n. In other words, there must exist a threshold for g-we characterize this threshold as γ -n 1 (c) in Theorem 2-beyond which vertical differentiation would disappear.
We now consider what happens when g starts decreasing below this threshold. Of course, if the development cost is negligible, trivially, all vendors would continue to offer a quality level of one, irrespective of the value of g. However, if the development cost is significant, some vendors would have to drop their quality level below one, but we will show that they can do so only one vendor at a time. To prove this last claim, suppose that two vendors drop the quality level to below one at the same time. At the value of g where this occurs, these vendors must be barely at the same interior solution. However, from the proof of Proposition 1(v), it is clear that no two vendors can have the same interior solution. Therefore, when g decreases, vendors would not only drop their quality levels from one, but would also do so only one at a time, while maintaining the order of their quality levels. Equivalently, as g increases, their qualities would reach one at different values of g. It is also clear from the proof of Proposition 1(iv) that, once a quality level reaches one, it cannot drop when g increases further. Taken together, it is clear that, as g increases, the segmentation level in the market gradually decreases. #
Proof of Theorem 2
To prove the existence of the inverse function, it is sufficient to show that γ n (g) is a strictly monotonic function. It turns out that . The first and the third terms are clearly negative since g > 2. Furthermore, since δ > 0, when g > 2, it can be shown, after some algebra, that the second term cannot be positive. Therefore, C < 0, implying B < 0. Since A > 0 always, this, in turn, implies that A > B, which completes the proof of the first part.
For the second part, we note that the oligopoly equilibrium can be in only one of (n + 1) regions. Let Region I denote the range of g values with the first market configuration, where all vendors offer the quality level of one. Similarly, let Region II be the range for the second one, where only the lowest quality vendor, namely vendor 1, offers a quality level below one (θ 1 < 1). Vertical differentiation will be observed as soon as the equilibrium outcome moves out of Region I. Therefore, we only need to examine the boundary between Regions I and II. In both the regions, θ 2 = θ 3 = … = θ n = 1, and it follows from Proposition 1(iii) that x 2 = x 3 = … = x n . Let x h denote this common market share. The optimization problem of vendor 1 can, therefore, be simplified to (
The following first order condition must be satisfied by the solution of the unconstrained problem:
Since, at the boundary of Regions I and II, θ 1 = 1, we substitute it above to obtain (A4) 
Proof of Proposition 2
Since , using l'Hospital's rule twice, we get 
